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CAN INDIANA CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSE ED-
UCATIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSION
TO THE STATE BAR EXAMINATIONS?
BY BERNARD C. GAvIT.*
I shall not keep you in suspense for half an hour or more-
the answer to the question is YES.
I am not going to rehash my arguments' previously presented
to establish the constitutional validity of some regulation on the
subject of admissions to the bar in this state. Assuming that
our constitutional provision on the subject of admissions has not
been stricken from the constitution by amendment it is still clear
to me that that specific provision offers no obstacle to the present
set-up. The reasons can briefly be summarized.
In the first place earlier decisions and statutes are in conflict
with the assumptions which rest upon the last two cases. It
certainly was decided in the first case on the subject that the
constitutional provision in question set only a minimum stand-
ard or gave only a privilege of applying for admission under rea-
sonable regulations, for in that case2 it was decided that a stat-
ute which prohibited a recorder from practicing law was valid.
In the next cases a woman, not a voter, was held to be entitled
to admission. In 1881 the Legislature passed an act4 authoriz-
ing circuit courts to enquire into the learning of applicants.
One can not reconcile those cases and that statute with the as-
sumptions resting upon the Denny5 and Boswell6 cases, nor were
they mentioned in those decisions. 7 Certainly then the question
* Dean, School of Law, Indiana University. This paper was read at
the January meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association.
116 Am. B. A. J. 595, 743; 6 Ind. L. J. 67; 7 Ind. L. J. 209, 226.
2 McCracken v. State, 27 Ind. 491 (1867).
3 In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind. 665 (1893).
4 Acts 1881, Sec. 831; Sec. 1033 Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
5 In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104 (1901).
O In re Boswell, 179 Ind. 292 (1913).
7 The cases dealt solely with the interpretation of the word "elector" as
used in the constitutional provision as to the amendment of the Constitu-
tion. There is thus really no conflict between them and the earlier cases.
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is not foreclosed and it is still incumbent on our Supreme Court
to make a conscious choice on the subject. When the matter
is properly presented the earlier decisions will be found to rest
on a substantial basis and to be the present law on the subject.
In the second place it is in any event true that the phrase
"good moral character" in the constitution does not forbid rea-
sonable regulations on the subject of admissions to the bar, but
indeed invites them. How is the constitutional provision in
question to be administered unless some extended enquiry is
made into a candidate's qualifications and history? I know of
no way of appraising a man's character other than by an enquiry
into his attainments; no way of predicting how one will act in
the practice of law other than by knowing in the most complete
detail what he has done in the past, what his attitude toward
social existence has been. I do not wish to reiterate the argu-
ments I have previously presented to prove that "good moral
character" as a constitutional concept is meaningless unless it
be accepted in its broadest common meaning. Good character
of moral fibre is in very truth a concept which may well
include much more than the most advanced thought of today
imagines. I am quite willing to predict that twenty years from
now people will be amazed at the narrowness of our concept of
professional character at its best.
Those who are willing to accept an inadequate concept of good
moral character today in this connection labor under two dis-
tinct illusions. They apparently believe that the constitution
is an existing thing and that in some way or other its framers
buried in it a dead idea; that the judicial process here is simply
to apply that existing, but dead, thing to the present situation.
But no error has been more emphatically and consistently
denied. Courts have ceaselessly reiterated the obvious propo-
sition that the purpose of a constitution is not to bury a dead
idea but to vitalize a general concept, or principle, or doctrine
because of its permanent value, both for the present and the
future.72 Its purpose is not to tie future generations to the nar-
rowness of the present, but to wed them to a deep sustaining
The cases, on the point they did decide, are undoubtedly unsound. They
have been re-examined by Mr. Frank Richman and his conclusions will
appear soon in an article in the Indiana Law Journal.
72 The most effective reiteration of this obvious principle of constitu-
tional law is to be found in the recent Minnesota moratorium case. Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, - U. S. -, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
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values admitted by all to be a safe guide and to lead along a
path of progressive attainment. There is nothing to indicate
that the constitutional convention of 1851 did not frame the
provision in question on that high plane so that there is every
reason and all precedent to sustain its construction on that basis.
Indeed the framers of the constitution are entitled to the pre-
sumption that they did not in one clause of the constitution give
the courts complete power over admissions and in another clause
repudiate the gift. Nothing is more firmly established today
than the proposition that the constitutional separation of powers
allocates to the courts the power over admissions to the bar. It
is almost uniformly regarded as an essential element of the con-
stitutional judicial power.8 Certain it is then that a subsequent
contradiction of that grant of power by the clause in question is
to be avoided by a reasonable interpretation of it under accepted
rules of constitutional interpretation. If any additional reason
were needed to give to the phrase "good moral character"
a liberal interpretation it is certainly present.
The second illusion in this connection is that good moral char-
acter in an attorney (and certainly the constitution is talking of
nothing less than that and the cases so decide9 ) is a rather
meagre concept. Those people make a conspicuous error as to
the real significance of the lawyer's place in American society
and the obvious necessity of a decent concept and standard as
to professional character and conduct in an attorney.
The answer to this error is the answer to the principal ques-
tion. The matter must be settled on the substantive merits. I
am not going to indulge in any legalistic argument to prove my
point, but I am going to point out the simple self-evident prac-
tical considerations which sustain it. The question really is,
Does public policy sanction educational prerequisites for admis-
sion to the bar? One has only to accept common facts and a
half decent concept of the lawyer's place in society to secure an
affirmative answer.
The training and resultant character of lawyers so far as they
affect individual interests have been sufficiently stressed to need
8 See, In the Matter of Paul Richards, - Mo. -, 63 S. W. (2d) 672
(1933); State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932); People v.
People's Stockyards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931); In
re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932); Brydom-
jack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 437, 281 P. 1018 (1929); and note, 66 A. L. R.
1512.
9 See, for example, Ex parte Walls, 73 Ind. 95 (1880).
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no additional emphasis at this time. But even lawyers, how-
ever, forget apparently that we have a government of judges.
It is perfectly obvious that in no strict sense can we have a
government of law and not of men. Government must be run
by men until our machine age reaches the delightful millennium
when iron and steel can be endowed with brains and all of our
problems solved without effort on our part.
The idea sought to be conveyed by that common dogma is that
the men who run the government shall be guided not by their
own peculiar notions of propriety, experience and justice but by
the accumulated experience of the past and the best thought and
vision of the present as it is embodied in constitutional utter-
ances, accepted and published principles of law, and a judicious
extension of them to meet changing needs. Ultimately under
any governmental system there is government by men. That
they should submit to restraints is obvious but that there should
finally be a superior tribunal with power to enforce the intended
restraints is peculiarly and uniquely an invention of the Ameri-
can Constitutional system of Government.
There is a vast distinction between our system and most
others. (In some of the newer republics our system has been
copied). In most governments there is the same division of
governmental functions as in ours as between the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary. There are also constitutional re-
strictions on the exercise of governmental power in each field.
But only under the American system is it established that there
is one of the three departments of government which is finally
superior to the others. Only under our system is it established
that the final determination of private and public interests rests
in the courts. For example were Parliament and the Crown in
England to set up a National Recovery Administration the only
possible attacks upon it would be either revolution, or repeal.
Under such a system the majority is always right.
It is a curious paradox, therefore, that in a so-called Democ-
racy we concede to our judiciary the power of thwarting even
the majority. There is a review of all legislative and executive
action in the calmness,-the objectiveness,-the quiet of a judi-
cial tribunal before "trained" men. It has been thought, at least
by the judges and lawyers, that if final review on legislative,
executive and judicial action is to be given to anyone it could
most properly be given to the judges. And being in a position
to decide the matter they have so decided. The privilege of
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making a mistake is thus arrogated to the courts to the exclusion
of the legislature and the executive. It is not a facetious state-
ment but a provable truism that the judicial function is the
power to make mistakes-to finally decide a matter, rightly or
wrongly. We are entitled therefore to take any action which
will reasonably tend to minimize the mistakes.
There is no logical and probably no practical compulsion to the
doctrine of the supremacy of the judges. (Witness the number
of governments which get on well enough without it). This
doctrine has arisen out of the lawyer's acceptance at its face
value of his belief in or opinion as to his own superiority. The
matter which is continuously on trial is not the supremacy of the
courts-that is established-but it is the superiority of the
legal profession. Finally the former must rest on the latter,
and it is just as valid, theoretically and practically, as the latter
proves from day to day to be.
Those who are concerned with the maintenance of our present
system of constitutional government are in the last analysis
really concerned with the training and character of. our law-
yers. Even if one were to wish a change until the change can
be accomplished he has too an immediate interest in those mat-
ters.
When a citizen employs an attorney he wants one who is
intelligent, learned and honest. But if he is honest within the
bonds of common decency unfortunately the primary concern
on that phase of his character ends. As an advocate for indi-
vidual interests the client might reasonably and properly wish
that the attorney leave the adversary's interests to his attorney
and the judge.
But when the attorney becomes a legislator and executive and
finally judge the concept of honesty and professional character
broadens and properly he considers not only individual interests
but those of the adversary and society as a whole as well. He
must not only be honest with the individual; he must be honest
with his opponent and the general public. The judging process
is one of the noblest and certainly the most difficult of human
occupations and it is perfectly apparent that under our consti-
tutional set-up everyone has a direct and immediate interest in
the learning and the character of lawyers. The ultimate success
or failure of our experiment in Democracy depends upon him
to a very large extent. In government there is no substitute
for learning, intelligence and tolerance. Unless lawyers possess
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those characteristics we shall fail, and to thq extent that they
do not have them we do fail.
One of the accepted powers of government is the power to
perpetuate its existence on a high plane. Certainly no one can,
therefore, successfully deny the immediate social interest in the
training and character of lawyers. If any business is affected
with a public interest certainly the law business is. Calling it a
profession is after all simply another way of expressing that
truth. It is the social element in the legal profession which
must sanction any regulation in the field of admissions to the
bar. All that is necessary is that there be found a reasonable
basis for it in present and past experience and a reasonable
expectation that it will serve the purpose intended.
II
Experience demonstrates that a bar examination, of itself, is
insufficient. One need not minimize its obvious usefulness in
order to point out its ineffectiveness kor all purposes, and par-
ticularly its ineffectiveness in promoting the broadest character
training in prospective lawyers. The latter is not a formal
thing so that the bar examination covering simply the appli-
cant's knowledge of formal law does not, and can not meet the
entire problem. -All that the bar examination can do is to insure
that the candidate has a minimum amount of formal knowledge,
which, however essential it may be (and I do not intend to min-
imize it in the least) is not the whole of professional character.
Certainly it is but part of it.
This is established by the experience of the law examining
boards in this country. Statistics for the country show that
whereas an average of 55% of all applicants (first-timers and
repeaters) fail at each examination, finally about 90% of all
applicants succeed in passing before they are barred from fur-
ther examinations or become discouraged. In New York the
final average has been 92-95%o; in Pennsylvania, 88-937%; In Illi-
nois, 86%; and in California, where they have made a particular
drive against repeaters, 70-83%. In this state our board has not
been operating long enough so that any applicant has had an
opportunity to fail the five examinations permitted, but it is
apparent that our final record on this score will be in keeping
with the common experience in other states. This demonstrates
that the minimum of a formal legal education required by the
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best of bar examinations is indeed a minimum, for it can be ac-
quired successfully by almost anyone regardless of his scholastic
and social background, if he be persistent. A school boy can
learn rules of law just as he learns mathematics, however little
he understands either. Despite the lawyer's pride in what he
is pleased to call his acquisition of the power of "legal reason-
ing" it is apparent that, at least as tested by the present bar
examination "legal reasoning" seems to be composed of a rather
narrow formal knowledge plus a mediocre system of logic. It
is therefore but a proper beginning.
It thus becomes increasingly clear that the best of bar exam-
inations can not be an exclusive tool in solving the problem of
admissions to the bar. Any ex post facto determination of a
candidate's fitness in any event is unjust to the candidate; any
strictly formal examination is unjust to the public and the bar.
Professional character can not be developed or measured but
slightly in any such haphazard way. When we realize that
professional character consists of a broad and deep learning
plus a socialized point of view it is clear that it can not be left
to chance. The problem must be passed on to the schools, as
it has been in the medical world.
A comparison with the situation in the medical profession is
illuminating, and humiliating.
The medical profession has succeeded in eliminating to all
practical purposes, the commercial medical school. But in 1932
there were 185 organized law schools in this country, and in
the neighborhood of 55% of those schools must be classified as
commercial or profit-making schools. They enroll about 55%
of the law students. The American Bar Association over ten
years ago established a minimum standard for admission to the
bar of two years of college and three years of law school work.
The Association of American Law Schools established the same
standard thirty-two years ago. The dividing line between the
schools meeting or bettering that very minimum standard and
those which do not meet it is pretty much the line between the
commercial and the non-commercial schools. At least ten new
law schools (including several in this state) were organized
during 1933,-all of them commercial, making no pretense of
meeting any standards.
One of the more humiliating of the comparisons is that where-
as with about half a dozen exceptions the doctors have succeeded
in imposing a standard of two years of college work and gradu-
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ation from an approved medical school as a pre-requisite for
admission to the medical examination, lawyers and judges have
not succeeded in establishing a similar standard in a single
state!* (It is but fair to say, however, that several states do
approximate this minimum standard, allowing law office train-
ing as a substitute for law school work.) In view of the fact that
in practically all states the courts have the power to make the
rules as to admission to the bar it is very apparent that lawyers
have not strained themselves in their efforts on the subject.
The medical profession has something more than a vocal be-
lief in its place in society and the professional character of its
members. A minimum of learning and character development
is actually accepted as an essential point of departure. On the
other hand the bitter truth is that the legal profession is still
given to talk. It is confused by the difficulty of actually choosing
between its vocal standard which makes of the lawyer an aristo-
crat of learning and character, and the vicious American dogma
of equality which makes every moron a potential lawyer. Stand-
ards for admission to the bar lose their vitality in the senti-
mental glamour of an unreal philosophy as to social existence
and human nature. The only gain which is worth while now is
an actual acceptance by the legal profession of its theory as to
the superiority of lawyers, and a will to impose the necessary
standards on applicants for admission to the bar. In a pioneer
society the governmental and social structure could stand the
strain of the self-made man. Many believe that our modern
more complicated structure can not even stand the strain of the
self-made business man. Common observation demonstrates
that the self-made man is quite likely to be a rather crude prod-
uct from a social point of view. It should be apparent to all
that the superiority of lawyers is a relic of the past unless the
modern race of lawyers is both theoretically and actually su-
perior and that indeed social progress can not longer be asked
to put up with mediocre lawyers. An insurance of a little knowl-
edge is not enough, however valuable it is as a beginning.
Consider this additional fact. Law is exactly as broad and
deep as life itself; it is the most comprehensive of all of the
mental disciplines, being the only one which is all inclusive.
* Since this paper was written New Mexico has, by court rule, adopted
the standards of the American Bar Association as prerequisites for admis-
sion to the state bar examination.
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How can an illiterate person, no matter how adept he may be
in memorizing rules, really know or understand law? It is sim-
ply physically impossible.
III
We must have lawyers who not only have a decent concept as
to the demands of the legal profession, but some assurance, too,
that in their everyday life they will actually choose professional
conduct. The only possible distinction between a business and
a profession is that the first is individualistic while the second is
socially minded. A business man has only to look to his profits
and let his competitors and all others look to their interests. A
professional man measures his conduct not only by his own indi-
vidual needs and ambitions but by the social consequences of his
action. Professional men are constantly called upon to sacrifice
personal interest for the common good.
Common disaster lies in the obvious difficulty of acting socially
(professionally) in an individualistic society. A lawyer's ideals
are in very truth at complete odds with his environment. Those
who criticize him the most, who make the most of his frequent
failures, are those who add to his already impossible situation
by their own inconsistent demands that their own individual
interests are beyond social control.
What appears to be an irreconcilable conflict, however, finally
reduces itself to a battle which is won or lost only after the
conflict has been actually met by the empirical test of action.
There are many irreconcilable conflicts in nature, the one be-
tween free will and determinism being a most illuminating ex-
ample. Both principles are in truth valid, although in the test
of action one or the other must be a decisive force.
So it is here. The professional ideal is simply tested, and
the battle won or lost in the field of everyday action. The char-
acter of lawyers is finally the determining factor as to whether
or not the conflict is won or lost. Is superiority a fancy or a
reality? Assuming that we are committed to a doctrine of law-
yer supremacy what elements insure its practical success?
The start surely is with a decent concept of professional char-
acter. Then if the concept be sufficient the determining factor
certainly is the successful development of professional charac-
ter. Common decency and some intellectual attainment are as-
sumed. But the additional requirements have not been so obvi-
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ous. The principal requirement has indeed been overlooked if
not even repudiated. Professional character really is the sum
total of ordinary decent character plus a deep and broad learn-
ing, plus a scientific attitude, a social viewpoint. Only with that
equipment can a lawyer maintain his superiority as the directing
genius of our experiment in social Democracy. That is true
even in the cases where on the face of it the attorney is dealing
only with his client's interests. There can no longer be even
in theory a clear cut dividing line between individual interests
and public interests. Each is limited by the other.
The development of a professional character which will stand
the test of action in modern life must obviously be delegated to
the law schools. Practically all lawyers are trained in law
schools of some kind. Character is set during the school period.
If the school fails there is no second chance.
The kind of school, and the form and substance of legal educa-
tion are of controlling importance. On the first score the com-
mercial or profit-making law school is doomed. It is physically
impossible to keep one's head and heart in the atmosphere of
idealism and his hand in the cash register at the same time. The
latter too often measures the former, and inevitably so.
Assuming a law school whose policies are not dictated by
financial expediency there are immense problems left. The form
of professional conduct is of relatively little importance. Little
time need be given then to the teaching of "legal ethics" in the
sense in which that phrase has previously been used. The form
and substance of the instruction as to Law and the Judicial
Process in their social aspects are the determining factors in the
result. There must be a broad and deep training in a tolerant
(scientific) spirit.
There is thus every reason to demand of applicants for admis-
sion to the bar some such training. The minimum standards
accepted by the legal profession for ten years and by the stand-
ard law schools for over thirty years can not be said to be too
high. We are already committed to the view that there should
be a dividing line between those qualified and those not qualified
to practice law, and pushing the line up to meet the actualities
of present experience and settled opinion by the experts in the
field is more than reasonable,--it is the only sane and sensible
thing to do. Its constitutionality is thus obvious.
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IV
One of the most persuasive arguments in favor of such a limi-
tation is that it effectively places a barrier before the applicant
who is so willing to get by on the barest minimum; who is so
anxious and willing to offer the least in exchange for a license
to practice. I can not escape the conclusion that the applicant
for a public license as a member of a learned profession who is
willing to apply for a license without the preparation which is
commonly accepted as the minimum standard ipso facto, at
least prima facie, demonstrates his unfitness for the license. He
wishes the public authorities to certify that he is learned (in the
best sense of that word) ; that his moral fibre is far above aver-
age; and that he has that capacity for disinterested social action
which is the very essence of the concept of professional charac-
ter! Again it's no good talking about law being a profession
unless we mean by that that our ideals of conduct forsake the
immediate personal gain for a social value. And unless we mean
further that in the field of action the supposed professional man
has at least an even chance of choosing the latter in preference
to the former. There is no positive guarantee for that result,
but that it is impossible of conception and attainment unless the
foundations of character be deeply laid is more than obvious.
The applicant who wishes a certificate as to those qualities
who has little or none of them condemns himself. He certainly
demonstrates that it is questionable if he ever will, even under
the best of conditions, measure up to any decent standard of
professional conduct. My own observation is that the young
men who are willing to give the most in exchange for a license
to practice are the ones we are later to count on most, and that
those who are willing to give the least at the start of their pro-
fessional careers are likely to continue on the same plane
throughout the balance of their lives.
The easiest task in the world is to fashion the ideals of a
"rugged individualism"; the next easiest task is to attain those
ideals in everyday life. But true professional ideals and conduct
are quite different things. Experience amply demonstrates that
the best indication of a man's future is his past and present;
that professional ideals and conduct can not be left to chance;
and that certainly they are not attained in the market places
of a cheap and abbreviated education. The doctrine of "caveat
emptor" has no place in legal education, nor in the standards for
admission to practice.
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I do not forget that a great many students are imposed upon
by the sales talk of commercial schools. Indeed one of the most
obvious justifications of a decent standard of educational pre-
requisites is the needed protection of the law student himself.
V
In the face of the facts legal authority is superfluous. It is,
however, available. The truth is that Indiana is one of eight
states' 0 which last year did not have some educational prerequi-
sites for admission to the bar. Seldom have those requirements
been questioned. Courts have found no difficulty in sustaining
them." The uniformly high standards for medical license give
point to their factual and legal validity.12
In Indiana practically every other business and profession is
licensed under stringent qualifications, including general edu-
cation. Indeed a barber must have graduated from an approved
barbering school and served as an apprentice for eighteen
months before he is eligible to take the state examination for a
license.13
No one can successfully point to any valid distinctions on this
score between the legal and the medical professions. Yet the
Indiana law for twenty-five years has been that two years of
college work plus graduation from an approved medical school
are prerequisites for admission to the state examination.
I know of no excuse except criminal neglect which will longer
sanction that odious comparison. Isn't twenty-five years behind
quite a safe distance, even for lawyers?
10 Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, Utah and Vir-
ginia. This is as of June, 1933.
11 See, for example, In re Bergeron, 220 Mass. 472, 107 N. E. 1007
(1915).
12 See, for example, Louisiana State Board v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111
So. 58, and note, 54 A. L. R. 594 and references there made (1926).
13 Sec. 4, 5, Chap. 48 Indiana Acts 1933.
